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Immediate Appealability of Orders
Denying Class Certification: Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay and Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its recent
decisions in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay' and its companion case,
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,2 Court followers immediately
styled Coopers & Lybrand "the death knell of the death knell." Witticisms
aside, however, the commentators were unanimous in their opinion of the
cases-Coopers & Lybrand, in tandem with Gardner, had dealt a
formidable blow to the maintenance of class actions, particularly
"consumer" class actions,3 in the federal courts.4
The major impact of Coopers & Lybrand was the destruction of the
death knell doctrine,5 and "the death knell of the death knell" is certainly
apropos. But Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner did much more than this.
Taken together, the two cases have effectively foreclosed every available
avenue of nondiscretionary6 interlocutory' appeal from an order deciding
1. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
2. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
3. The term "consumer class action" was coined to describe a class suit by a large number of
individuals who each have a relatively small claim. Since they are particularly useful to remedy illegal
overcharges, broken warranties, and deceptive trade practices-problems that frequently plague the
consumer-consumer class actions are often the backbone of a suit against a large manufacturer or
distributor. See Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L. Rav. 21 (1970). Economic
recovery is only one facet of consumer class actions, however, since they also have a "subtantial
therapeutic value." Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),rev'don othergrotnds.
438 F.2d 825 (2nd Cir. 1971).
Consumer class actions depend upon the possibility of spreading the cost of litigation over the
amount recovered by the entire group. Since each litigant bears only a fraction of the legal fees and
expenses, his otherwise worthless claim becomes large enough to merit attention. See Kirkpatrick,
supra; Starrs, 77ze Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B. L. REv. 407
(1969). Because the action's viability depends on spreading the cost of litigation over a number of
claims, however, denial of class status is almost alvays fatal. See text accompanying notes I 1-12infra.
4. The scope of this Case Comment does not include state doctrines of interlocutory review of
class certification orders, although several states have decided this issue. The cases fall into three
groups. One group has flatly forbidden an immediate appeal under any circumstances. See, e.g.,
Taylorv. Major Fin. Co., 289 Ala. 458,268 So. 2d 738 (1972); Levine v. Empire Sav. & Loan Assoc., 34
Colo. App. 235,527 P.2d 910 (1974), aff'd,536 P.2d 1134(1975); Ross v. Amrcp Corp.,42 N.Y.2d 856,
397 N.Y.S.2d 631, 366 N.E.2d 291 (1977) (nie.). A second group of cases has permitted immediate
appeals, relying on the particular wording of the forum's jurisdictional statute. See, e.g., Reader v.
Magma-Superior Copper Co., 108 Ariz. 186,494 P.2d 708 (1972); Rogelstad v. Farmers Union Grain
Terminal Assoc., 224 N.W.2d 544 (N.D. 1974); Roemisch v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 39 Ohio St. 2d
119,314 N.E.2d 386 (1974). The final group of cases has allowed appeals understate lawssimilarto the
federal statute (28 U.S.C.§ 1291). See, e.g., Daarv. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695,63 Cal. Rptr. 724,
433 P.2d 732 (1967); Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co.,465 Pa. 225,348 A.2d 734 (1975).None
of the states, however, has adopted a death knell rationale as the basis for an appeal. See, e.g., Bell v.
Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. at 233, 348 A.2d at 738 (specifically rejecting death knell).
5. For an explanation of the death knell doctrine, see text accompanying notes 21-32 infra.
6. Appeals in the federal courts fall into two basic categories. Those under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
1292(a) (1976) may be taken as a matter of right. See text accompanying notes 14-15 infra. On the other
hand, appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) and FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) require the discretionary
approval of either the district courtjudge, ordistrict and appellate courtjudges. See text accompanying
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whether an action may be maintained as a class action.8 Since the viability
of a suit often depends on whether it will continue as a class action, these
notes 16-17 infra. The first type are often xeferred to as nondiscretionary appeals and the second as
discretionary appeals.
7. Much of the discussion of class action appeals is couched in terms of finality. These appeals,
like any appeal from any order entered before final judgment, are nonetheless interlocutory. The reader
should not be confused by this unfortunate overlap in terminology.
It is also important to distinguish between immediate appealability and ultimate reviewability. It
has never been disputed that class certification orders are appealable after entry of finaljudgment, The
issue in Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner was whether these orders may be appealed immediately, that
is, without awaiting the ultimate disposition of the action on the merits.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 governs class actions. It provides:
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) tile
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fairand efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest ofmeihbers of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) DETERMINATION BY ORDER WHETHER CLASS ACTION TO BE MAINTAINED; NOTICE;
JUDGMENT; ACTIONS CONDUCTED PARTIALLY AS CLASS ACTIONS.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if Ie so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel,
(3) Thejudgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1)
or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom
the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
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two decisions may not only inter the death knell doctrine, but may cause
the stillbirth of many future law suits as well.9
Despite the importance of these cases, the Court's analysis may best
be characterized as lackluster. The Coopers & Lybrand opinion is marked
by formalism and excessive concern for statutory wording. Its consider-
ation of the policy behind the rules-and today one must concede that
the Supreme Court is a policymaking body'-is cursory at best. The
Gardner opinion is similarly insubstantial. If the Supreme Court intended
to put class action appeals in their grave, one would have at least expected
a decent burial. The Court, however, barely bothered to write an obituary.
This Case Comment will examine Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner,
paying special attention to these shortcomings. Part I will sketch the
background against which the cases were decided. Part II will present the
Court's views and analyze them in terms of precedent and policy. Finally,
Part III, in an effort to round out the Court's reasoning, will critically
evaluate important arguments that were not considered by the Court.
I. BACKGROUND: COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION IN
CLASS ACTIONS BEFORE Coopers & Lybrand
AND Gardner
A. The Need for Immediate Appeals from Class
Certification Orders
Both Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner have their roots in the class
litigant's desire to take an immediate appeal from an adverse class
certification ruling. The district court's decision on this question will
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.
(d) ORDERS IN CONDUCT OFACTIONS. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or
prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some orall of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of
the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or delcnses, or othenvise to
come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties oron intervenors;
(4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to
representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;, (5) dealing with
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and
may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) DISMISSAL OR CotPRoMIsE. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manneras the court directs. (As amended Feb.28,
1966, effective July 1, 1966.)
9. See text accompanying notes 11-12 infra.
10. Commentators disagree whether the Court should have a policymaking role. Compare L.
LEvy, AGAINST THE LAW 25-36(1974) andA. BICKEL, TnE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANci 1-33 (1977) With
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT aY THE JUDICIARY 300-11,351-62 (1977). There can be little doubt, however,
that the Court has assumed such a role. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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frequently bear upon whether the case will be settled, 2 what strategy the
parties will use, and whether the plaintiff will continue or be forced to drop
his suit.' 2 Thus, it is essential, from the standpoint of the losing party, that
the ruling be appealed immediately. Even when the class determination is
not pivotal, however, class suits present such a monumental advantage (or
burden, depending upon one's point of view) that the parties would
normally like to have appellate review of the certification question before
the case proceeds on the merits. Defendants are likely to take an appeal in
an effort to avoid the tremendous cost and complexity that invariably
accompanies class action litigation. 3 Only after a final determination of
the issue on appeal will the parties be able to proceed intelligently.
B. Statutory Basis for Appeals
It is not always possible to satisfy a litigant's desire for an immediate
appeal. Federal appellate jurisdiction is a child of statute, and Congress
has not been generous in enacting provisions that permit interlocutory
appeals. A decision is immediately appealable as a matter of right only if it
is a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 " or if it falls
within the narrowly defined class of orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) 5 from
which Congress has specifically permitted an interlocutory appeal. If these
criteria cannot be satisfied, an interlocutory appeal can be pursued only
with approval of the district court judge-if jurisdiction is based on Rule
11. Because of the enormous potential liability, defendants often choose to settle a case as soon
as it is certified as a class action. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 oF TIIE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 15-17 (1972). Compare Herbst v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 495 F,2d 1308, 1313 (2d Cir,
1974) with Rosenfeld, The Impact of Class Actions on Corporate and Secirities Law, 1972 DUE L.J.
1167, 1190 and Note, Appealability of Class Action Determinations, 44 FORDIIAM L. REV. 549,577-78
(1975). As a result, several commentators have criticized class actions as a "form of legalized
blackmail." Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971). See also Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destructlon,55
F.R.D. 375, 388-89 (1973).
12. See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeal Prom Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1970); Note, supra note 11. The courts have recognized this fact as well, See, e.g.,
Jiminez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 628 (1975).
13. See, Share v. Air Properties G., Inc., 538 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nomn,
Woodruff v. Air Properties G., Inc., 429 U.S. 923 (1976).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from allfinal decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court (emphasis added)."
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1976) provides:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1.) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . or of thejudges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court;
(2.) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or
other disposals of property;
(3.) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or thejudges thereof determining the
rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are
allowed;
(4.) Judgments in civil actions for patent infringement which are final except for
accounting.
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54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 6-or the district and
appellate court judges-if jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). 17 Moreover, since approval is discretionary, a party must
usually rely on section 1291 or section 1292(a) if he is to be certain of
securing an appeal.'
8
C. Judicial Interpretations of 28 United States Code
sections 1291 and 1292(a)
1. The Cohen Rule
Since strict application of the jurisdictional standards often produced
inequitable results, the appellate courts developed a number of exceptions
in which an immediate appeal could be taken from a district court ruling
under sections 1291 and 1292(a). Originally, the collateral order doctrine
provided the basis for all such appeals. This rule, articulated by the
Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,'9 permitted
an interlocutory appeal from "that small class [of decisions] which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated."20 Orders that satisfied these requirements were
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 since they were final orders. Concep-
tually, therefore, Cohen was simply an interpretation of section 1291.
2. The Death Knell Doctrine
Although the collateral order doctrine has been the underlying theory
on which a number of appeals were based, it was never used extensively as
16. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) a trial court"may direct the entry of a finaljudgment as to one or
more but fewer than all the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is nojust
reason for delay and upon an express direction for entry ofjudgment." If the court complies with these
requirements, the order falls within the ambit of "linal decisions" and is appealable under § 1291.
9 MOORe'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.09, at 129 (2d ed. 1975)[hereinafter cited as Mooaa's]. The fact
that Rule 54(b) certification is discretionary creates a major obstacle to class litigants, however. See
text accompanying notes 188-194 infra.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question or
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after
the entry of the order ....
18. It is not entirely accurate to say that discretionary certification is the only alternative to an
appeal of right under §§ 1291 and 1292(a). A party may always seek review of an order by way of
mandamus or similar writ under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). The availability of mandamus is extremely
limited, however, and its practical usefulness is questionable. See text accompanying notes 201-05
infra.
19. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
20. Id. at 546.
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a source of appellate jurisdiction for class action appeals. 2' Instead, liti-
gants chose to rely on other theories, principally the injunction provision
of section 1292(a), which met with limited success. 2 It was not until the
courts developed the death knell rule, a variation on the collateral order
doctrine, that class action appeals were successfully taken. In recent years,
it has been this doctrine on which appeals from class certification orders
have relied.23
The death knell rule was originally enunciated by the Second Circuit
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen J).24 Judge Kaufman, 5 writing for
the court, recognized that the final decision language of section 1291 did
not limit appealable decisions to the last order that could possibly be made
in a case. He noted that the Supreme Court had issued a mandate "that the
requirement of finality be given a 'practical rather than a technical
construction.' ,26 Judge Kaufman went on to say that denying plaintiff
right to appeal the trial court's denial of certification would, for all
practical purposes, end the litigation since no lawyer of competence would
undertake such a costly and complex case to recover the plaintiff's
individual claim.2' Dismissal of the class action sounded "the death knell"
of the lawsuit and was, therefore, a "final" order within the meaning of
section 1291.28
While Judge Kaufman purported to apply the collateral order
doctrine, a more careful analysis of the opinion indicates that Eisen I
actually established a new basis upon which class action appeals could be
taken.29 Subsequent cases recognized and refined this distinction.3" By the
time Coopers & Lybrand came before the Supreme Court, therefore, the
death knell rule was well enough established to provide an immediate
21. The term "class action appeals" is a shorthand expression foriiinmcdiate appeals from class
certification orders.
22. See, e.g., All Am. Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954).
23. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Dist. Sys. Antitrust Litigation, 551 F.2d 213 (8th Cir, 1977);
Caceres v. International Air Transp. Assoc., 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970); City of New York v. Int'l Pipe
& Ceramic Co., 410 F. 2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
24. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
25. The death knell doctrine was developed primarily in the Second Circuit, with Judge
Kaufman spearheading the effort. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Eisen I, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
26. 370 F.2d at 120 (citing Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 121.
29. Id. at 120. Judge Kaufman stated that the issue in Eisen Iwas whether the trial court's order
dismissing the class action came within the Cohen rule. The rest of hi. opinion, however, ignored
Cohen and independently assessed whether the lower court's order was "final" as that term is used in
§ 1291.
30. See, e.g., Share v. Air Properties G., Inc., 538 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denledsub
nom. Woodruffv. Air Properties G., Inc., 429 U.S. 923 (1976) ("It is our view that the collateral order
doctrine and the death knell rule represent two distinct but compatible tests for appealability.");
Siebert v. Great N. Dev. Co., 494 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1974); King v. Kansas City S. Indus., lnc,,479
F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973) (recognizing autonomy ofdeath knell rule but refusing to adopt it), But
see Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); City of New York v. Int'l Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969) (two cases which muddle the distinction).
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appeal from an order denying (but not granting31) class certification if the
individual plaintiffs claim was so small that he could not continue the
action by himself.
32
3. Appeals Under Section 1292(a)(1)
Some cases, particularly those in which nonmonetary relief was
sought, did not fit into this scheme,33 and many class litigants were forced
to seek another source of appellatejurisdiction. In an effort to fill this void,
the courts developed another exception to the traditional jurisdictional
requirements. Unlike the death knell rule, however, this exception was
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
Section 1292(a)(1) has always permitted interlocutory appeals from
orders that deny an injunction.34 It was a relatively simple matter for the
courts to expand the scope of this statute to provide a basis for appeal from
a class certification ruling entered in an action in which an injunction was
sought. The reasoning, simply stated, was that the district court's order
limited the scope of any future relief to such an extent that it had the effect
of "denying" an injunction.
This rationale was first employed by the Fourth Circuit in Brunson v.
Board of Trustees.35 Brunson had filed a class action against the Clarendon
County, South Carolina school system alleging racial discrimination and
praying for injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the class action, 36
31. Appeals from orders granting class action status are an entirely different matter. Mostcourts
have recognized that these orders are not appealable since, unlike a certification denial, there is a
substantial chance that the district court will later reverse itself. See Appealability of Class Action
Determinations, supra note 11, at557-61; General Motors Corp. v. City ofNew York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d
Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit, however, has allowed appeals from orders certifying a class under its
"three pronged" test. See Herbstv. Int'lTel. andTel. Corp.,495 F.2d 1308,1313 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 574 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1978). In light of recent decisions,
however, it would seem that the Second Circuit is no longer willing to follow this approach. See Shelter
Realty Corp., supra; Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1975); Kohn v. Royall,
Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. Korm v. Franchard Corp., 443 F. 2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). The death knell doctrine was not,
however, a universally accepted rule in every circuit. Compare Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550
F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,437 U.S.463 (1978);Sharev.
Air Properties G., Inc., 538 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. deniedsub non. Woodruffv. AirProperties
G., Inc., 429 U.S. 923 (1976); Ott v. Speedwriting Co., 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975); and Gosa v.
Securities Inv. Co., 449 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971) (adopting the death knell doctrine) with King v.
Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973) and Hackett v. Gen. Host Corp., 455 F.2d
618 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (refusing to adopt the death knell doctrine).
33. Because the death knell rule focused on the amount of the individual's claim, it did not lend
itself to cases that sought, for example, injunctive relief. In most lawsuits, the plaintiffsecks Xdollars
and it will cost him Y dollars to recover it. While there may be a certain intrinsic value in vindicating
one's rights, a simple cost-benefit comparison will usually indicate whether a class representative will
continue the action by himself. On the other hand, the "worth" of an injunction may be an
unmeasureable quality that depends upon the personal values of those seeking it. Consequently, it is
impossible to determine objectively whether the individual plaintiffwill persist if class action status is
denied.
34. See note 15 supra. Section 1292(a) (1) %as added by Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No.475,
§ 129, 36 Stat. 1134 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) (1976)).
35. 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963).
36. Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 30 F.R.D. 369 (E.D.S.C. 1962). Prior to the amendment of
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and an immediate appeal was taken from the ruling. The Fourth Circuit
agreed with plaintiff that an appeal need not await disposition of the
individual claim. It noted that the trial court's decision limited the scope of
any possible injunction to an order requiring the admission of a particular
plaintiff to the school of his choice," and went on to hold that the lower
court had denied "the broad injunctive relief which the plaintiffs sought."09
The order consequently "denied" an injunction and was appealable under
section 1292(a)(1).
Several other circuits eventually adopted the Brunson analysis. 39 In
most circuits, therefore, disappointed class litigants were able to secure
immediate review of the district court's adverse order under either section
1291 or section 1292(a)(1). Many cases were reversed on appeal; in others
the lower court's decision stood. Regardless of the outcome, however,
potential class representatives were consoled by the certainty of a final
result. It was this certainty that the Supreme Court upset in Coopers &
Lybrand and Gardner.
II. THE FACTS OF THE CASES AND THE
COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
The Coopers &Lybrand case presented a scenario that has become
increasingly familiar during the last twenty years. In 1972 respondents
purchased five thousand dollars worth of debentures and one hundred
shares of stock in Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., a Florida land development
company, relying upon a registration statement and prospectus that had
been certified by the national accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand .
Shortly thereafter, Punta Gorda restated its earnings for 1971 and 1972 by
reducing net income for each year by one million dollars. 41 As a result, the
value of Punta Gorda securities declined sharply, and respondents
liquidated their holdings, sustaining a $2650 loss. 2
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 in 1966 it was common for a c6urt to "dismiss" the class. In some cases the court
treated the class and the representative plaintiffas two separate entities, see, e.g., All Am. Airways v,
Elderd, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1954), while in others it dismissed the entire complaint and granted leave
for the individual to file an amended complaint without class allegations, see, e.g., Oppenheimer v, F. J.
Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944). Regardless of the language used, however, the result seemed
equivalent to a refusal to certify under the present Rule 23.
37. 311 F.2d at 108.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 574 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Diamond, 519
F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1974); Yaffe v, Powers,
454 F.2d 1362 (Ist Cir. 1972). Contra, Williams v. Wallace Silversmiths, Inc., 566 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.
1977); Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975) (refusing to
allow an interlocutory appeal).
40. Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1108 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub tno).
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
41. 437 U.S. at 465.
42. Id.
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On July 27, 1973, respondents brought suit against Punta Gorda, its
officers and directors, and Coopers & Lybrand in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, seeking to represent
themselves and approximately eighteen hundred other persons who had
purchased securities pursuant to the 1972 offering.43 The complaint alleged
various violations of the federal securities laws and prayed for monetary
damages. 4 The district court refused to rule on plaintiff's motion to certify
as a class action and entered a stay of all discovery except discovery
relating to the class determination.45 Plaintiffs finally sought a writ of
mandamus, requesting that the district court be ordered to lift its stay on
discovery." Although the court of appeals refused, it did "suggest" that the
lower court proceed.47 The district court thereupon certified the suit as a
class action, only to decertify it again a few months later.48 An immediate
appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
upheld jurisdiction based upon the death knell doctrine and reversed the
district court's order decertifying the class.
49
The Supreme Court granted Coopers & Lybrand's petition for
certiorari 50 and reversed the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss
the appeal for the lack of jurisdiction. The Court, citing Catlin v. United
States,5' noted that "[f]ederal appellate jurisdiction generally depends on
the existence of a decision by the District Court that'ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.' ,52 It went on to hold that "[ain order refusing to certify, or
decertifying, a class does not of its own force terminate the entire litigation
because the plaintiff is free to proceed on his individual claim" and that
"[s]uch an order is appealable . .. only if it comes within an appropriate
exception to the final judgment rule."" In the final analysis, the Court
decided that neither Cohen nor the death knell doctrine, the two
exceptions on which respondents had relied, provided such an exception.
5 4
From the standpoint of precedent, it is difficult to say that the Court's
analysis was plainly incorrect. There is no authoritative definition of
finality, and a good argument can be made to support the result reached in





48. Id. at 1108-09.
49. Id. at 1113. That the Livesays did not request certification under § 1292(b) or Rule 54(b) is
not surprising, given the trial judge's erratic behavior.
50. 434 U.S. 954 (1977). The Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
See note 32 supra.
51. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
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Coopers & Lybrand. On the other hand, as the following discussion will
show, there is ample support for the opposite conclusion.
1. Cohen: Situational Jurisdiction
The Court began its consideration of Coopers & Lybrand by
analyzing the applicability of the collateral order doctrine.55 As was
previously noted, the Supreme Court held in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp. that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives the federal courts of appeals
jurisdiction over appeals from collateral orders. 56 The language of Cohen
was relatively clear and permitted an immediate appeal only if certain
requirements were met: (1) the decision could not be tentative, informal, or
incomplete; (2) the question presented by the appeal had to be too
important to await a decision on the merits; (3) it was necessary that
effective review be in doubt if an appeal was delayed until entry of a more
conventional final order; and (4) the decision had to be separate from the
merits. 57 If these prerequisites are construed narrowly-and the Court's
cursory treatment of this area would tend to indicate that it read Cohen
literally-the Court was undoubtedly correct when it decided that
Coopers & Lybrand did not fit within the collateral order doctrine. But the
courts, including the Supreme Court, had never interpreted Cohen
literally. From the beginning they engaged in a process of erosion that
greatly expanded the number of cases that could be brought within the
framework of the collateral order doctrine.58 Consequently, the Court's
conclusion that "the collateral order doctrine is not applicable to the kind
of order involved in this case"59 is a dubious and unexplained restriction of
the Cohen rule.
Until Coopers & Lybrand there was little to indicate that the courts
would carefully scrutinize a case to make certain that it satisfied each
requirement of the collateral order doctrine. The emphasis had always
been on the "practical rather than . . . technical construction" language
of Cohen,60 and a given situation was typically analyzed by balancing the
various criteria against one another.61 For example, an appeal did not need
to be entirely separate from the merits if the appellant would be seriously
injured by delaying review or if review at a later time would be wholly
inadequate.62 Frequently, "the combination of injury with a significant
55. The Court's cursory analysis of the collateral order doctrine amounted to little more than an
assertion that the prerequisites of Cohen were not met. 437 U.S. at 469.
56. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
57. 337 U.S. at 546. See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOI'ER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3911, at 468 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER],
58. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911, at 470-72.
59. 437 U.S. at 469.
60. 337 U.S. at 546.
61. See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 1,18 (1964).
62. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1975):
The plaintiffs . . . argue that the defendants' assertion (that they will be irreparably harmed
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question of law" was, without more, enough to justify an appeal.6 3 As a
result, the courts allowed many appeals when theoretical imperfections
were outweighed by the importance of immediate review.
In addition, the individual requirements of Cohen had never been
subjected to a narrow construction. The first requirement forbids an
appeal from any order that is "tentative, informal, or incomplete.""
Conceivably, this language could have excluded from consideration many
district court decisions, such as class certification orders, that are subject to
modification or correction at a later time. It has not. Instead, the courts
have seized upon other language in the Cohen opinion to temper the
bluntness of the passage:
Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not of intervention. So long
as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no
intrusion by appeal. But the District Court's action upon this application was
concluded and closed and its decision final in that sense before the appeal was
taken.
65
The distinction between intervention and review is important. An
appellate court sits only to correct errors; it is the trial court's responsibility
to adjudicate the claims of the parties to a lawsuit.66 Once the trial court
has reached a decision on a particular question, however, appellate review
does not present a danger of interference by the upper court because the
trial judge's deliberations can no longer be colored by the appellate court's
decision. Consequently, the test of Cohen has not been whether the lower
court would have no further opportunity to change its ruling, but whether,
as a practical matter, its consideration of the matter was closed. As one
author has put it: "It is enough that no further consideration is
contemplated.,
67
The impact of this analysis on orders that deny class certification is
debatable. Class certification rulings are, of course, open to modification
or amendment at any time6 8 and a narrow construction of the finality
requirement would unquestionably preclude immediate appeal. Never-
theless, since this criterion has been more broadly interpreted, it is at least
by delaying review) begs a question which requires a plenary trial ....
We find the arguments of defendants to be the more persuasive . . . . Tihe question of
appealability does not turn on the correctness of an appellant's claim (at least so long as it is
not frivolous). Rather, the issue is whether his right to appellate review of that claim-
whether ultimately successful or not-will be effectively lost if jurisdiction is denied.
See also Weingartner v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 431 F.2d 26,29 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1000 (1971). ("The Cohen approach rests upon either of two underpinnings: the 'collateral order'
rule ...or the likelihood of'irreparable harm' to a party if immediatc review is not allowed . .. ");
Convey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 995-97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964
(1965). See generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911. at 483-85.
63. 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911, at 493-94.
64. 337 U.S. at 546.
65. Id.
66. See text accompanying notes 179-80 infra.
67. 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911, at 470.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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arguable that class action denials are sufficiently determinative-as a
practical matter-to attain the requisite degree of finality. While a trial
judge may be willing (and perhaps waiting) to decertify a class at the first
opportunity, there is nothing to indicate that after an initial denial, the
same judge will be ready to grant class action status at a later point in the
proceedings. Indeed, such a course of action runs directly contrary to the
established policy of speedy resolution of the class certification question,69
and presents serious due process problems.70 In most cases it would seem
that once a court refuses to certify a class, "no further consideration is
contemplated." Orders denying class certification could, therefore, satisfy
the requirement that the trial court's decision not be tentative, informal, or
incomplete.
The collateral order doctrine also requires the presentation of a
"serious and unsettled question. 71 Here again, however, the requirement
has been read quite broadly. Some courts of appeals, relying on the
controversial nature of the question of law presented in Cohen, 72 have
interpreted the word "unsettled" as restricting the collateral order doctrine
to cases that present a substantial issue of law.73 Other courts, however,
have sustained jurisdiction over appeals that had no significant impact
outside the case before them, 74 and a substantial number of courts have
"tactfully ignored" the requirement, reasoning that the Supreme Court's
language merely interjected a degree of discretion into the process. 75 It
would certainly seem, therefore, that a decision as important as a class
certification ruling would qualify as a "serious and unsettled question,"
frequently because it does involve a novel question of law, but equally as
often because it can make the difference between a multimillion-dollar
lawsuit and no suit at all.
The third prerequisite for application of the collateral order doctrine
is that there must be a substantial risk of loss if the district court's decision
is not reviewed immediately. This requirement is firmly rooted in the
language of Cohen:
The purpose [of section 1291] is to combine in one review all stages of the
proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying notes 212-25 infra.
71. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
72. The question presented in Cohen was whether a federal court, havingjurisdiction because of
diversity of citizenship, was bound to apply a state statute that made the plaintiff-stockholder liable for
the corporation's expenses in an unsuccessful stockholder's derivative action and required plaintiff to
post security for the expenses if the corporation so demanded. 337 U.S. at 543-45, Since the statute was
obviously designed to deter stockholder suits, this question produced a great deal of controversy. See
9 MOOR'S, supra note 16, at 110.10.
73. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773
(2d Cir. 1972). See also United Auto Workers v. Nat'l Caucus of Labor Comms., 525 F.2d 323,325 (2d
Cir. 1975); Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293,298 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 980 (1974); Donlon Indus. Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
74. See, e.g., In re Cessna Distrib'ship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1976).
75. 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911, at 472.
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judgment results. But this order of the District Court did not make any steps
toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in
final judgment. When that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review
the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable,
will have been lost, probably irreparably.76
It is not difficult to elicit the underlying concern which prompted this
comment. The Supreme Court was obviously troubled by the possibility
that Cohen might be used to sanction piecemeal appeals, thereby creating
the potential for waste of judicial resources.77 The "risk of important loss"
requirement is a warning against misapplication of the doctrine. As a
result, the interpretation of this requirement has been clear. a decision is
appealable under the collateral order doctrine only if it will not merge in a
final judgment, making review at a later time ineffective.78
Given this analysis, the Court's assertion that Coopers & Lybrand
does not satisfy the third requirement of Cohen lacks credibility. As the
Second Circuit pointed out in Eisen I, "[tihe alternatives [upon denial of
class certification] are to appeal now or to end the lawsuit for all practical
purposes., 79 And, even if the court's order does not end the lawsuit, it will
at least end the class action.
The Court's invocation of United Air Lines v. McDonald' does not
alter this conclusion. While McDonald does permit review of a class
certification ruling after entry of final judgment, it does not provide an
effective means of review. In McDonald, the Court decided only that a
putative class member could intervene after judgment was entered for the
purpose of appealing the district court's denial of class certification. 8' It did
not reach the issue of what would happen upon reversal of the lower court's
ruling-a question for which there is no readily discernible answer.82 It is
possible that certification after entry of judgment in the original action
would require de novo consideration of the case vis-i-vis the class
members. 83 At any rate, it is doubtful if the new litigants could try their
action solely on the issue of damages. 84 Even ifa class certification denial is
reversed, the class members will have lost the opportunity presented by the
initial action.85 Consequently, it is unquestionable that, in the absence of
an immediate appeal, a ruling denying certification will cause irreparable
injury.
76. 337 U.S. at 546.
77. See text accompanying notes 177-78 infra.
78. See Swift & Co. v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684,689 (1950); Greene v.
Singer Co., 509 F.2d 750, 751 (3d Cir. 1971).
79. 370 F.2d at 120.
80. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
81. Id. at 391-96.
82. See text accompanying notes 214-25 infra.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. In effect, the class members will be commencing a new suit. Id.
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Finally, the collateral order doctrine permits an immediate appeal
only if the lower court's decision resolves an issue separate from the merits.
The purpose of this requirement is unmistakable. Repeated consideration
of a case on appeal entails a waste of judicial resources since the appellate
court must continually reacquaint itself with the facts. If the alleged
discrepancies are combined in a single appeal, however, the higher court
need only review the case once, saving both time and expense.86 As Justice
Powell pointed out in Eisen IV "[rjestricting appellate review to 'final
decisions' prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused
by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but
a single controversy.""
But Justice Powell also recognized that "[t]he inquiry requires some
evaluation of the competing considerations underlying all questions of
finality--'the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand
and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.' ,,88 In construing
Cohen, the courts have taken this notion to heart. As a result, the
requirement that the lower court's decision be separate from the merits has
been extensively eroded, and the necessity of considering the merits has not
been a bar to immediate appellate review in many cases in which the result
of delay would have been a serious loss to the appellant.89 Similarly, courts
have undertaken a review of the merits before entry of fi nal judgment when
the only alternative was to leave the party with no means of securing
effective review.90 Although Cohen requires severability from the merits in
theory, the courts are often willing to ignore the requirement in practice.
The relevance of this development to the Coopers & Lybrand case is
clear. Most class certification orders, as the Court noted, do involve some
consideration of the merits. 9' This entanglement, however, is minor in
relation to the consequences of denying an appeal-namely, inadequacy of
review and the probability that a serious loss will be inflicted on the class
members. There is no valid distinction between orders that deny class
certification and other orders, such as those disapproving a proposed class
action settlement,92 over which the appellate courts have asserted jurisdic-
tion. Consequently,* the Court's conclusion that a class determination
is not appealable since it "generally involves considerations that are
'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of
action' "9 stands on shaky grounds.
86. 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911, at 470-71.
87. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
88. Id. at 171 (citing Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)), See
generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3907, at 433-35.
89. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3911, at 486-94.
90. Id.
91. 98 S. Ct. at 2458.
92. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769,772-74 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. deniedsub norn. 151 Corp. v,
Meyers, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
93. 437 U.S. at 469.
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It would seem, therefore, that Coopers & Lybrand could have been
brought within the scope of the collateral order doctrine. The Court's
failure to do so is suspect. Its conclusion is even more questionable in light
of other decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in recent years,
particularly Abney v. United States.94 In Abney a district court was
prepared to try the petitioners a second time on charges of extortion
despite their objections that a retrial would violate the fifth amendment
prohibition against double jeopardy.95 Rather than suffer through a
second trial, petitioners filed an immediate appeal from the court's pretrial
order denying their motion to dismiss the indictment. 96 The court of
appeals affirmed in summary fashion, 97 and the Supreme Court granted
98certiorari.
While the Court had little trouble disposing of petitioners' substantive
arguments,99 it did consider the appealability issue at some length. The
final conclusion was that the district court's order fell within the Cohen
rule and was consequently a final appealable order under section 1291.1°°
This result is wholly inconsistent with the Court's strict interpretation of
the rule in Coopers & Lybrand. Although the order appealed from in
Abney differs significantly from a class certification ruling, both are subject
to the same analysis for the purpose of determining finality.' 0' Unless the
district court's decision met each of the collateral order requirements,
therefore, Abney was not immediately appealable.
But Abney did not satisfy the requirements of Cohen, at least not as
the Court has construed them in Coopers & Lybrand, and therein lies the
difficulty. It is impossible to decide the issue of double jeopardy without
some examination of the merits, not only in the case at bar but in prior
proceedings as well. This evaluation is no less probing than the class
certification inquiry to determine whether there are common questions of
law and fact. 10 2 Consequently, pretrial orders rejecting a claim of double
jeopardy are immediately appealable only if the Court is willing to accept a
broad construction of the collateral order requirements-that is, only if it
is willing to undertake some review of the merits on the justification that
94. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
95. Id. at 653-55.
96. Id. at 655.
97. Appeal of Abney, 530 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1976).
98. 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
99. 431 U.S. at 663-65.
100. Id. at 662.
101. As the Court noted in Abney, civil and criminal appeals are both subject to the samejurisdictional requirements. Id. at 656.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). In either case the district judge will at least have to look through the
pleadings. The court is more likely to be drawn into the merits by a motion to dismiss based on double
jeopardy grounds, however, since the judge must then decide if the issues to be litigated in the case
before him are the same as those in the prior prosecution. By comparison, thecourt need only evaluate
the common interests of the class members in making a decision under Rule 23.
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appellant would suffer serious, irreparable injury by delaying appeal.10 3
The contention that Abney was appealable because the potential injury, a
deprivation of constitutional rights, was far more serious than in Coopers
& Lybrand only strengthens this argument since it recognizes that in a
given case the Court will decide finality by applying an ad hoc balancing
test.
The Court was clearly willing to accept this balancing approach in
Abney; why, then, did it balk in Coopers & Lybrand? The only plausible
answer is that the two cases are irreconcilable. It is inconsistent to apply
one standard in the Abney case and another in Coopers & Lybrand. As in
the past, the Court has once again construed the collateral order doctrine
to fit its needs.
10 4
2. The Death Knell Doctrine
Since the death knell doctrine was originally a spinoff of the collateral
order doctrine,'0 5 many of the criticisms discussed in connection with the
Court's treatment of the Cohen case apply with equal force to its rejection
of the death knell rule. Death knell, however, was also a viable theory in its
own right and an independent source of appellate jurisdiction.'0 6 Its
justification entails considerations that go beyond those that support the
collateral order rule. The Coopers & Lybrand Court dealt with some, but
by no means all, of these considerations in its opinion.
The death knell doctrine stood on slightly different theoretical
grounds than Cohen and the collateral order doctrine. Cohen and its
progeny were based on the theory that an order can be final even though it
is not the last decision rendered in a case.10 7 On the other hand, Eisen I, the
decision that originally laid down the death knell doctrine, was premised
upon the idea that an order denying class certification is a final order since,
for all practical purposes, it is the last decision that will be made. 10 8
The proposition than an immediate appeal should lie from an order
that is the functional equivalent of a final decision generally meets with
little resistance.t°9 It is an entirely different matter, however, to forge this
sentiment into a workable principle of law. The problem of feasibility
frequently troubled the courts when they confronted the death knell
doctrine, " and it was obviously the Court's main concern in Coopers &
Lybrand. As the opinion pointed out: "[A]llowing an immediate appeal
103. Cases similar to Abney make this even clearer. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972)
Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).
104. Professor Moore views the collateral order doctrine itself as a makeweight developed to
meet the exigencies of the moment. 9 MOORE'S, supra note 16, 110.10. at 130.
105. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
106. See notes 29-30 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
109. See, e.g., 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3912, at 501.
110. Id. at 503-04.
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from ... [orders that deny class certification] may enhance the quality
of justice afforded a few litigants. But this incremental benefit is
outweighed by the impact of such an individualized jurisdictional inquiry
on the judicial system's overall capacity to administer justice.""'
The Court's distaste for the death knell doctrine was centered around
what it considered to be two major shortcomings. First, it found class
action rulings indistinguishable from other rulings that had the practical
effect of terminating the action, and feared that appellate dockets would be
swamped if the Court endorsed death knell:
The appealability of any order entered in a class action is determined by the
same standards that govern appealability in other types of litigation. Thus, if
the "death knell" doctrine has merit, it would apply equally tomany
interlocutory orders in ordinary litigation-rulings on discovery, on venue,
on summary judgment-that may have such tactical economic significance
that a defeat is tantamount to a "death knell" for the entire class." 2
Second, the Court disliked the factfinding role that the courts had been
drawn into by the death knell rule: "The potential waste of judicial
resources is plain. The District Court must take evidence, entertain
argument and make findings; and the court of appeals must review that
record and those findings simply to determine whether a discretionary
class determination is subject to appellate review.'13
While these criticisms have some weight, they are not entirely valid.
The Court's first argument-the class certification orders are in-
distinguishable from other orders-is to a certain extent true. The Court
refused, however, to acknowledge the broader scope of the death knell
doctrine. Past cases identify three major categories of death knell orders,
only one of which deals with class actions' 1 4 A second group of cases had
adopted a death knell analysis for "orders that purport to leave matters
open, but that operate in combination with surrounding facts to make it
impossible to pursue the case further,"" 5 for example an order quashing
service of process on a nonresident defendant when there is no alternative
means of obtaining service." 6 Still another line of cases has applied the
death knell doctrine to "denials of temporary relief that seem likely to
forestall the possibility of any effective permanent relief."'"17 These cases
typically deal with the denial of temporary restraining orders when the
party's real concern is immediate rather than long-term relief."8
111. 437 U.S. at 473.
112. Id. at 470.
113. Id. at 473.
114. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3912, at 501.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821
(1964). The appeal in Berkowitz was actually from an order refusing to transfer the case, but the
difference is immaterial.
117. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3912, at 501.
118. See United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
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Consequently, it is difficult to understand how the adoption of class
action death knell would have led to a proliferation of appeals. There was
already a substantial application of a death knell-type analysis outside the
class action area at the time Coopers & Lybrand came before the Court.
The acceptance of the death knell doctrine as a basis for class action
appeals would not, therefore, have resulted in an expansion of appellate
jurisdiction beyond existing limits.
There is language in Coopers & Lybrand indicating that the Court
considered class certification orders to be distinguishable from other
orders to which a death knell analysis had been applied in the past on the
basis that class action denials have only a "tactical economic signi-
ficance."' 19 This distinction recognizes that nothing prevents the named
plaintiff from going forward with his claim in the face of the district court's
denial of class certification except his own decision that he is unwilling to
spend more than his possible recovery. By comparison, a plaintiff who has
seen the court quash service on a nonresident defendant could not, as a
practical matter, proceed in that forum even though lie would like to. Any
distinction based on these grounds, however, is tenuous and fails to
recognize the underlying character of class actions. Unlike unfavorable
decisions on discovery, venue, or summary judgment-the examples cited
by the Courtl2°-the denial of class action status will almost always result
in dismissal of the action. There is an underlying assumption, at least in
cases to which the death knell doctrine would apply, that the parties will
not proceed at all if they cannot proceed as a group.12 ' It is illogical to lump
class action orders in with all others simply because their impact is the
result of economic rather than legal impossibility. The denial 'of class
action status will end the action just as surely as if the court had quashed
service on a nonresident.
An even greater drawback of the death knell doctrine, in the Court's
eyes, was the necessity of deciding when a certification denial had the
practical effect of terminating the action. The Court found this task to be
an intolerable imposition that was bound to cripple the appellate system if
left unchecked. This criticism of death knell, however, was unduly
pessimistic and failed to take account of the rule's positive attributes.
More basically, the Court was concerned that the death knell doctrine
was simply unworkable. It pointed out that the courts of appeals had
developed two tests for determining appealability, one that entailed a
comparison of the named plaintiff's claim with a preselected jurisdictional
amount and a second that required a thorough study of the impact of the
district court's order. 22 The first of these was condemned as arbitrary and
119. 437 U.S. at470.
120. Id.
121. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
122. 437 U.S. at 471-72.
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"a legislative, not a judicial function"; the second as having "a serious
debilitating effect on the administration of justice."'2' These criticisms are
unwarranted, however, in light of the refinements to the death knell
doctrine that had been made by the Fifth Circuit.
Eisen I was a straightforward instance of a lawsuit that would not
survive absent class action status. It was obvious without further
investigation that Mr. Eisen was not going to continue his "complex and
costly case to recover $70. Consequently, Judge Kaufman could "safely
assume" that the lower court's order had effectively terminated the
action. 125 As more and more cases were appealed under the death knell
doctrine, however, it became impossible to make this assumption with
such confidence. 126 Later cases in the Second Circuit-where nearly all the
early death knell appeals were taken-were much closer, and the appellate
court could only estimate the impact of the trial court's order on the basis
of the information before it.
27
The-Fifth Circuit was dissatisfied with this procedure, particularly in
marginal cases, in which the Second Circuit's approach tended to favor
dismissal. 28 Consequently, in Gosa v. Securities Investment Co.'29 it laid
down a new rule that was designed to develop the necessary information:
In the instant case, plaintiff's individual claim is $3,322.20. Thus it is not
a case . . . in which we should clearly accept jurisdiction under the 'death
knell'theory, or . . . in which we should clearly denyjurisdiction. Each case
of this type depends on its own facts. The position of the case before us now,
which falls in the financial middle ground, is doubly confounding because
what is wholly a fact issue is presented to an appellate court without the
benefit of any fact development on the very issues which would control death
knell finality. We would have to engage in rank speculation if we were to
undertake the determination of such matters . . . . In short, aside from
knowing the dollar amount claimed, we have nothing on which to base our
necessarily ad hoc determination.
If the plaintiff wishes to assert that what was otherwise a purely
interlocutory ruling was effectively converted by the practical circumstances
of the matter to an extinction of the very right to litigate, the plaintiffhad the
burden of developing these facts before the trial forum, which could afford an
opportunity for adversary rebuttal and could enter findings and conclusions
on this issue. Such a post-ruling hearing eliminates the procedural deficiency
of requiring this Court to speculate without the benefit of relevant record
facts or a decision on the real issues presented. 30
123. Id. at 472-73.
124. 370 F.2d at 120.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Shayne v. Madison Square Garden, 491 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
127. See, e.g., Shayne v. Madison Square Garden, 491 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974).
128. Both Shayne, id., and Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), were
dismissed by the court of appeals.
129. 449 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971).
130. Id. at 1332-33 (footnotes omitted).
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
After Gosa, then, the plaintiff-appellant was responsible for establishing
facts in the trial court from which the appellate court could determine that
the action would not continue absent class certification.
The Fifth Circuit made two important refinements of this rule in Graci
v. United States.'3' First, the court decided that the determination whether
continuation of the lawsuit was infeasible was ultimately an issue for the
court of appeals. 3 2 The district court's sole function was to take testimony
and hear argument, and then render findings on "the size of the individual
plaintiff's claim, the extent of his financial resources, and the probable
expense of prosecuting the lawsuit to completion .. ..""' Second, it
indicated that Eisen Iand other cases decided by the Second Circuit could
be explained in terms of judicial notice: "An individual claim may be so
small that the unfeasibility [sic] of litigation by the individual plaintiff is
clear without any further showing ....""'
Taken together, Gosa and Graci alleviate the Supreme Court's
concern that the death knell doctrine is too difficult to administer. The two
cases provide a clear, easily applied method for determining when a party
can continue. It is unnecessary for the appellate court to closely investigate
the facts since they have already been laid out by the trial judge. Nor is the
district court saddled with a heavy burden, since most of the information it
needs-for example, the size of the claim, the litigant's net worth, and the
approximate cost of litigation-is readily available and could probably be
submitted on paper without an elaborate evidentiary hearing. 135
It is difficult to explain the Court's concern in light of the Gosal Graci
rule. The two cases clearly provide a workable rule for determining the
feasibility of continued litigation. The list of horribles that the Court
envisioned 36 is hardly likely to materialize. In short, the death knell rule
would have entailed neither a "potential waste ofjudicial resources" nor "a
serious debilitating effect on the administration of justice."',37
Other, less weighty objections that the Court raised also fail to justify
abandonment of the death knell doctrine. For example, the Court
criticized the rule on the ground that it benefits only plaintiffs, leaving
131. 472 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
132. Id. at 126. Before Graci there was some question on this point since the court had merely
instructed the lower court to "enter indings and conclusions on the issue." Gosa v. Sec. Inv, Co., 449
F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1971).
133. 472 F.2d at 126.
134. Id. (citing Eisen I, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966)).
135. A trial judge who is intent on preventing a class action might effectively deny appeal by
distorting his findings of fact. There is nothing to indicate, however, that district judges arc so intent on
avoiding appellate review that they are willing to intentionally subvert thejudicial process. Moreover,
the rule relegates district judges to a relatively mechanical task that easily lends itself to review. Tie
court wisely refrained from allocating to the trial court the ultimate determination whether the action
would continue. Such an allocation would have given the district judge a great deal of unreviewable
power.
136. 437 U.S. at 472-76.
137. Id. at 473.
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defendants who suffer the misfortune of having an action certified against
them with no choice but to proceed on the merits.138 The mere fact that a
defendant may not take an immediate appeal should not, however,
preclude plaintiffs as well. A rule of jurisdiction that is grounded in
statutory language and supported by sound reasoning should be adopted
regardless of whether it confers a benefit on one party but not the other.
"[T]he achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the
measure of the fairness of the rules of [law]." 39
The Court's criticism that "indiscriminate" (that is, nondiscretionary)
interlocutory appeal should not be allowed 40 also falls short of the mark.
The congressional decision to make appeals under28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) t4' a
matter of discretion was unquestionably sound and serves to protect the
judicial process from unnecessary and unwarranted appeals. It does not
follow, however, that all interlocutory appeals should be subjected to the
screening procedure imposed by that statute. As the Supreme Court has
recognized repeatedly, some orders, although entered before final
judgment, have sufficient indicia of finality that immediate appeals from
them will not upset the administration of justice. Class certification orders
should be included in this select group. Section 1292(b) was enacted to
permit immediate appeals from nonfinal orders when unusual cir-
cumstances mandated prompt review; it should not be used to deny review
of other orders that, because of their posture in the litigation, are final.
42
Finally, the Court argued that the death knell doctrine was
unacceptable because it thrust the appellate courts indiscriminately into
the trial process. 143 This is undoubtedly true: all interlocutory appeals
share this feature. But the Court, by isolating this single element of the
complex policy considerations that relate to recognition of prejudgment
final orders,' 44 has thus taken a narrow, one-sided view of the problem, a
view that hardly supports the result reached in Coopers & Lybrand.
B. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.
The facts of Gardner were typical of many civil rights actions. After
being denied a job as a radio station talk show "host" at a Westinghouse
owned station, petitioner, a woman, filed a class action suit alleging that
the company discriminated against female job applicants on the basis- of
138. Id. at 476.
139. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950).
140. 437 U.S. at 474.
141. See text of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) at note 17 supra.
142. Professor Wright has suggested that§ 1292(b) cannot be used as a basis forappealing orders
that are appealable as a matter of right. See A. Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958,23
F.R.D. 199, 203 (1959). The Coopers & Lybrand Court's readiness to shuffle orders back and forth
between these two categories thus presents conceptual difficulties.
143. 437 U.S. at 476.
144. See text accompanying notes 172-82 infra.
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sex. 145 She sought to represent a class made up of respondent's "past,
present, and future employees; unsuccessful female applicants; females
deterred by respondent's reputation from applying for employment; and
females who will not in the future be considered by respondent on account
of their sex."' 46 Her complaint prayed for injunctive relief for the entire
class. 1
47
Plaintiff moved for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b), but the
district court denied the motion on the grounds that her claim was not
typical of the class and that the group of claims did not present common
questions of law or fact.148 The Third Circuit dismissed her appeal for lack
of jurisdiction 149 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. rso
One might have expected the Court to reverse this typical civil rights
class suit using the rationale developed by the Fourth Circuit in Brunson v.
Board of Trustees.'5' In Brunson, as was previously noted, the Fourth
Circuit permitted an appeal from an order denying class certification under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) on the theory that the district court's decision
"denied the broad injunctive relief that plaintiffs were seeking in the
action."' 5 2 The Supreme Court relied instead on General Electric Co. v.
Marvel Rare Metals Co.' 53 and Switzerland Cheese Association, Inc. v.
E. Home's Market, Inc.5 4 in holding that orders denying class action
certification did not come within the scope of section 1292(a)(1).
Although the Court had never specifically placed its imprimatur on
the Brunson approach, several cases-including Marvel itself- tended to
indicate that it had endorsed the basic theory on which Brunson and its
progeny were premised. In Marvel the Court applied a rationale similar to
that of Brunson in holding that the dismissal of a counterclaim that sought
injunctive relief was the denial of an injunction within the meaning of
section 1292(a)(1). 55 Normally an order dismissing a counterclaim is not
immediately appealable since plaintiff's claim is still pending. 156 The
Court's decision, therefore, was significant for two reasons. First, it
acknowledged that an order "deny[ing] to [a party] the protection of the
injunction prayed"'57 was immediately appealable. Second, it established
145. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 479 (1978).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 479-80.
149. 559 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1977).
150. 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
151. 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963).
152. Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 1, 30 F.R.D. 369 (E,D.S.C. 1962), See
text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
153. 287 U.S. 430 (1932).
154. 385 U.S. 23 (1966).
155. 287 U.S. at 433.
156. 6 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 1408.
157. 287 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
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that a decision need not be stamped "injunction denied" in order to fall
within the ambit of section 1292(a)(1).
Other cases supported a practical application of the statute. Ir.
Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co.,158 for example, the Court
permitted an immediate appeal from an order staying the trial of an
equitable defense-an otherwise nonappealable deeision'59-on the
ground that it was, for all practical purposes, an order granting an
injunction. As the Enelow Court noted:
It is thus apparent that when an order or decree is made ...requiring, or
refusing to require, than an equitable defense shall first be tried, the court,
exercising what is essentially an equitable jurisdiction, in effect grants or
refuses an injunction restraining proceedings at law precisely as if the court
had acted upon a bill of complaint in a separate suit for the same purpose.
Such a decree was made in the instant case, and therefore, although
interlocutory, it was appealable to the Circuit Court of Appeals under
[section 1292(a)(1)].' 60
Other decisions of the Court reached the same conclusion.161 It is apparent,
therefore, that the word "injunction" in section 1292(a)(1), like the term
"finar' in section 1291, was to be given a broad definition. As long as the
order had the practical effect of denying an injunction, it was appealable
immediately as a matter of right.
The Court did not agree that Gardner was controlled by these cases.
Instead, it compared the case to Switzerland Cheese, 162 an earlier decision
that had limited the scope of section 1292(a)(1). In that case the district
court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and an immediate
appeal was taken under section 1292(a)(1).16a Even though plaintiff was
seeking an injunction in the underlying action, the court of appeals
dismissed the appeal. 64 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding section
1292(a)(1) inapplicable under the facts of the case. 65 Switzerland Cheese
is, however, easily distinguishable. Unlike Gardner or Brunson,
Switzerland Cheese did "not settle or even tentatively decide anything
about the merits of the claim."'166 While an order sustaining plaintiff's
158. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
159. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3923, at 48.
160. 293 U.S. at 383.
161. See, e.g., Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942). Cf. Baltimore
Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955) (holding that a stay order was "a step in controlling the
litigation before the trial court, not the refusal of an interlocutory injunction." Id. at 185.).
The Gardner Court attempted to distinguish EDelow and Ettleson on the ground that they
involved equitable rather than legal claims. 437 U.S. at 481 n.8. This distinction is untenable. See
Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. at 185-86 (Black, J., dissenting). Moreover, the relict
sought in Gardner was the traditional equitable remedy of injunction.
162. 385 U.S. 23 (1966).
163. Id. at 23-24.
164. 351 F.2d 552 (Ist Cir. 1965).
165. 385 U.S. at 24-25.
166. Id. at 25.
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motion would have granted an injunction, the court's order denying that
motion did nothing more than decide "that the case should go to trial.,' 167
The district court's order denying summary judgment did not, therefore,
preclude the issuance of an injunctive or narrow the scope of any future
injunctive relief. Under these circumstances, section 1292(a)(1) was clearly
inapplicable.
The truth of the matter is that the Court could easily have fit the
Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner cases within one of the recognized
exceptions to the finality rule. Why, then, did it not? One reason may have
been the nature of class actions. Despite the Court's disclaimer, 168 the
burgeoning number of class suits and their characterization by some as a
vexatious type of litigation 69 may well have had some impact on the final
outcome. Another explanation is the Court's continuing concern for
maintaining the integrity of the finality rule. Since Cohen, the courts have
been struggling to keep the exception from swallowing up the rule.
170
The Court's critical stance in Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner is not
surprising. Nevertheless, the foregoing explanation provokes a more
fundamental question: If the Court meant to take a stance on finality, were
these the proper cases in which to do it? This question is the subject of Part
III.
III. WHAT THE COURT FORGOT:
THE "MINOR DETAILS" OF FINALITY
The most glaring defect of Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner is not
what the Court said but what it failed to say. t7 1 Both opinions were marked
by total failure to acknowledge the policy arguments that favored
appealability of class certification orders and complete disregard for
possible adverse effects of the holdings. Since class action appealability
was not a clear-cut question, these issues should have figured prominently
in the decisions.
The finality rule delicately balances two counteivailing forces. On one
side is the policy against "piecemeal" appeals. 172 On the other is a
recognition that any continuation of proceedings in the trial court beyond
an order that is ultimately reversed entails a waste of judicial resources and
a hardship upon the parties.' 73 The general rule that "[a] 'final
decision . . . is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing . . . to do but to execute the judgment"' 74 has been adopted on
167. Id.
168. 437 U.S. at 470.
169. For a good discussion of whether class actions are really as detrimental as some
commentators would suggest, see Simon, supra note 11.
170. 9 MOORE'S, supra note 16, 110.10, at 134.
171. See text following note 9 supra.
172. See generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3907.
173. Id.
174. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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the theory that immediate review of every order would result in greater
waste than would allowing the lower court proceedings to continue."17 This
assumption, however, is not indisputable, 76 and the question of finality
frequently turns on more subtle distinctions.
Three major considerations militate against a broad interpretation of
finality. First, as the Court recognized in Coopers & Lybrand, there is a
deep concern for judicial economy and optimum utilization of scarce
judicial resources. 177 Postponing review furthers these goals by increasing
the possibility that the action will follow a course that makes the appeal
unnecessary. The parties might, for example, settle the dispute out of
court, an alternative that is almost always preferred over litigation178
Similarly, the challenged ruling may become insignificant either because
the party against whom it was decided ultimately emerges victorious or
because in the context of the trial court's final decision it emerges as
nonprejudicial error. Moreover, by consolidating review into a single
proceeding, the appellate court is spared the arduous and time consuming
task of refamiliarizing itself with the case.
A second consideration that weighs against immediate review of trial
court decisions is the nature of the relationship between the appellate and
trial CoUrtS. 17 9 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Cohen, appellate
review gives the higher court a power of review, not intervention.18 The
primary responsibility for conducting the proceedings rests solely on the
trial court. Delaying review increases the respect given the trial court's
rulings and vests the trial judge with sufficient authority to adequately
perform his supervisory function. It also adds to the continuity of the
action and the efficiency with which cases are decided.
Finally, interlocutory appeals are a potent weapon in the arsenal of a
party who is bent on delaying the action or harassing his opponent into
submission.' 8' An economically disadvantaged litigant may feel especially
burdened by the prospects of protracted litigation. While every litigant
must, as a practical matter, expect some cost and inconvenience, court
proceedings should not be unnecessarily taxing.
Given these considerations, one might wonder why interlocutory
appeals are permitted at all. A rule that allowed appeals only after entry of
final judgment would allay all these concerns and would have the added
175. 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3907, at 429.
176. As the Second Circuit explained many years ago," 'Final' is not a clearone-purposeword;
it is slithery, tricky . . there is, still, too little finality about'finality.' " United States v. 243.22 Acres
of Land, 129 F.2d 678, 680 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. deniedsub non:. Lambert v. United States, 317 U.S. 698
(1943). See also Gillespie v. U. S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
177. See generally 15 WRIGHrT, MILLER and COOPER, supra note 57, § 3907, at 430-32.
178. There has been a great deal of controversy on this point with respect to class actions. See
note I I supra. When class certification is denied, however, the question of "legalized blackmail" does
not arise. Id.
179. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3907, at 430.
180. 337 U.S. at 546.
181. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 3907, at 432.
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advantage of definiteness and clarity. It would not, however, provide the
utopia that the Court and some commentators have envisioned.
A rigid definition of finality entails a number of undesirable
consequences. For one thing, an interlocutory decision may dispose of
parties or claims, thus making it possible to hear an immediate appeal
without contravening any of the policies that demand strict enforcement of
finality.18 2 In such cases it would work a great hardship on the parties to
make them await final judgment solely for the sake of procedural niceties.
Unappealable interlocutory orders also present the potential for
needless waste of time and money since, in many cases, an appellate court's
only remedy is to reverse and remand for further proceedings. For
example, an erroneous ruling on a discovery motion can be corrected only
by reversing the ruling and giving the party an opportunity to retry his case
with the benefit of the new information. The original trial, which may have
gone on for weeks and cost the parties several thousands of dollars, will
have been for naught. Moreover, there is always the possibility that the
trial judge will make an error during the retrial, and the case will once again
be reversed and remanded.
The most pressing consideration in favor of a broadly defined finality
rule, however, is the impact that unreviewed orders can have on the merits
of a party's case. Because of the posture of a cas;e, failure to secure
immediate review may mean that it will be impossible, as a practical
matter, to ever appeal the court's ruling. Similarly, the delay inherent in
awaiting a final judgment may effectively deny the relief that the action
seeks, especially when temporary relief is sought pending final disposition
of the controversy.
The relationship between these considerations and the collateral
order and death knell doctrine is more than coincidental. For many years
the Court had tended to focus on the potential injury that would result
from delaying review, rather than the disadvantages of immediate
appeals.1 3 The Court has now ignored that trend and refused to consider
the tremendous adverse effects that Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner are
likely to have on class action litigants. This blindness is the gravamen of the
decisions. Had there been a satisfactory alternative available to
disappointed class representatives, the result in either case might have been
acceptable. Since there is none, Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner can only
be viewed as an unduly restrictive interpretation of a statutory scheme that
was meant to have a "practical rather than. ,. technical construction."'
18 4
This is not to say that every interlocutory order should be appealable
merely because it adversely affects one of the parties. But when the
statutory language is ambiguous, the possibility of serious, irreparable
injury should clearly tip the balance in favor of appealability.
182. Id. at 433.
183. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
184. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 5,16 (1949).
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As a result of Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner, a potential class
representative has only three courses of action once the district court has
denied certification: he may seek interlocutory review by way of a
discretionary appeal; he may continue his individual claim with the
intention of appealing the certification ruling upon entry of final judgment;
or he may abandon the class action (and possibly his individual claim as
well). All three of these options, however, leave the litigant in an
unsatisfactory position. He would, of course, prefer to appeal immediate-
ly, but the practical difficulties of securing discretionary review make this
alternative infeasible. On the other hand, delaying an appeal until entry of
finaljudgment may well leave him with no appeal at all. The final and most
likely option, dropping the action entirely, is equally unpalatable. There is,
consequently, a genuine possibility of "serious and irreparable injury" to
the individual plaintiff and the class members as the result of the Court's
decisions.
The practical infeasibility of discretionary review requires little
explanation. Because of its limited scope of availability and the necessity of
obtaining court approval, experienced trial attorneys are seldom confident
of securing an appeal under either 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Civil Rule 54(b),
particularly with respect to class certification orders. Under section
1292(b), for example, the district judge cannot certify an appeal absent a
finding that his order (1) "involves a controlling question of law" (2) over
"which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion," and (3) that
an immediate appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation."'' 5 Although Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,'8' a Third
Circuit decision, would suggest that class certification rulings satisfy these
criteria, the answer is not clear at all. Every certification ruling does not in-
volve a controlling question of law nor does it turn on an issue on which
there is a split of authority. Moreover, it could hardly be argued that the
reversal of a lower court's denial of class action status would materially
advance the termination of the litigation. Katz brushed over these "techni-
calities" by emphasizing judicial efficiency and the avoidance of hardship
to litigants.8 7 It is possible, however, that other courts will take a more
restrictive view of the requirements-particularly in light of the Court's
disposition toward nonappealability in Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner.
Civil Rule 54(b) 8' presents a similar problem. Under that provision, a
district judge cannot certify an appeal from his order unless it adjudicates
an entire claim(s) or enters judgment as to one or more parties. 1"The rule
explicitly provides that an order is nonappealable unless one of these two
criteria is satisfied.' 90 This creates a theoretical dilemma. Class members
185. The full text of § 1292(b) is set out at note 17 supra.
186. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
187. Id. at 754-56.
188. Rule 54(b) is set out at note 16 supra.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
190. Id.
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are not technically "parties" to the litigation until it has been certified as a
class action.191 How, then, can an order denying certification decide
anything, let alone enter judgment, with respect to "one or more parties?"
Moreover, an expansive reading of Rule 54(b) with respect to class
certification decisions could lead to abuses of the rule in other areas,
notably denial of intervention under Rule 24.192 While one circuit has
endorsed class action appeals under Rule 54(b), 193 it is uncertain whether
the Supreme Court would agree.1 94
Even if these requirements are satisfied, the class representative must
clear a second, far higher hurdle. Certification under either section 1292(b)
or Rule 54(b) is a matter of discretion, 95 and district judges are unlikely to
exercise their discretion to allow an appeal, especially in class action
situations. 96 A district judge may, for example, erroneously decide that
the order does not satisfy the prerequisites of section 1292(b) or Rule 54(b).
This belief, although mistaken, is virtually unassailable; the litigant must
show abuse of discretion, a very difficult burden to meet.197 A judge might
also, in the exercise of his "sound discretion," decide that the costs of the
interruption and delay exceed the benefits of immediate review. Moreover,
an appeal under section 1292(b) requires the approval of the court of
appeals as well as the district court, 98 and appellate judges may deny an
appeal for any reason, however frivolous. 199 Finally, one cannot ignore
"the possibility that an obdurate judge might thwart review '2 °0 simply
because he objects to an appeal. As a practical matter, therefore, it is
unlikely that a potential class representative will be able to secure
discretionary review of a class certification order.
191. See Note, supra note 1I, at 372-73. Compare Kahan v. Rosenstiel,424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) (holding that, pending a decision on the certification question, class
members should be treated as if they were parties for the purposes of settlement and dismissal),
192. At the present time, orders denying intervention are not immediately appealable. See 7A
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 57, § 1923, at 626. Compare 313 MOORE's, supra note 16,
24.15, at 24-561.
193. Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 1974); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp.; 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Hackett v. Gen. Host Corp., 455 F.2d
618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). None of these cases, however, involved an appeal under
Rule 54(b).
194. Moreover, since Rule 54(b) permits an appeal only by one who has had his claim
adjudicated, this analysis assumes that a class member will be willing to step forward and pursue an
appeal.
195. Both § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b) provide that a judge may allow an appeal. See notes 16-17
supra.
196. See American Bar Association, Report of Special Commisvion on Federal Rules of
Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 95, 104 (1965).
197. An otherwise nonappealable discretionary ruling may be challenged only be mandamus, In
ruling on a petition for mandamus, an appellate court looks only to see that the lower court did not step
outside the sphere of its discretionary power. See note 206 infra.
198. See note 17 supra.
199. S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S, CODE CONO. & AD, NEws
5255, 5257.
200. Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., concurring),
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A disappointed class litigant could, of course, seek "review" by way of
mandamus or a similar writ under 28 U.S.C. § 165 1, the"All-Writs Act."20'
Mandamus, however, is an "extraordinary remedy '202 and its practical
usefulness is questionable. The appellate court does not review the lower
court's order for error but only to make certain that the lower court has not
stepped outside its sphere of discretionary power.20 3 Unless the error was
blatant-almost malicious-the trial judge's ruling will be upheld.
Furthermore, a court of appeals often exercises its discretionary power to
refuse a writ.201 Thus, even in this day of "supervisory" and "advisory"
mandamus, 205 it is doubtful that the extraordinary writ presents a class
litigant with an alternative means of obtaining interlocutory review.
Some commentators have suggested that a plaintiff may secure'the
equivalent of an interlocutory appeal by refusing to plead further after the
district court has denied class certification.20 In that event, the action will
eventually be dismissed with prejudice,20 7 and plaintiff may take an appeal
from the resulting entry of final judgment. This is a drastic method of
obtaining review, since the dismissal acts as an adjudication on the
merits, 208 and can bejustified only when the plaintiff's claim is so small that
he would, in any event, be forced to dismiss the action-in other words, in
a "death knell" situation.
Moreover, in recent years some courts have begun to look through
this subterfuge and have refused to review the class certification order,2"
limiting their consideration to whether the district court abused its
discretion by dismissing the action, given the result of the certification
ruling.210 As the Third Circuit said in dismissing one such appeal:
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usage and principles of law .. .
202. Roberts v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Calif., 339 U.S. 844 (1950); E-rparte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947).
203. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90,95 (1967). See also Rochev. Evaporated Milk Assn,319
U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
204. Kerrv. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Calif.,426 U.S.394,403 (1976); Ha)akawa
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 1304, 1305 (1974).
205. The Supreme Court has shown an interest in mandamus as a means of"advising" lower
courts on novel questions of law and correcting recurring errors (i.e.,"supervising"). See Schlagenhauf
v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104(1964); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). Since this doctrine is
still undeveloped, however, supervisory or advisory mandamus does not present a reliable basis for
securing appellate review.
206. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 1297-98; Note, supra note 11, at 574.
207. Dismissal may be entered on the court's own motion or pursuant to a motion by the
opponent under FED. R. Civ. P. 41. In either case, a dismissal is with prejudice. Id.
208. Because the plaintifftakes an "all or nothing" chance that the appellate court will reverse the
certification order, one commentator has called this process "federal rules roulette." Note, supra note
12, at 1298.
209. Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Marshall v. Sielaff,492
F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974). Cf. Oppenheimerv. F.J. Young& Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944) (allo%ingan
appeal of the class certification question after a dismissal for failure to plead further).
210. Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 444,445 (3d Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Sielaff, 492
F.2d 917, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1974).
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This procedure appears to be an attempt to circumvent this court's well-
established policy disallowing interlocutory appeals relating to class
determination absent special circumstances. In adhering to this policy we
reiterate our disapproval of indirect attempts to accomplish that which
cannot be done directly. . . Since appellants do not contend that the order
of dismissal was in error, . . . the only issue that appellants would have us
decide is the correctness of the refusal of class certification by the district
judge.
We view appellant's strategy as an attempt to avoid this court's firm
position against interlocutory appeals of class certification deter-
minations. . . We accordingly dismiss the appeal for lack of an appealable
order.2 "
Even if a plaintiff is willing to accept its drawbacks, therefore, it would
appear that this procedure does not present a satisfactory opportunity for
review.
This leaves a class litigant with only one other choice short of
abandoning the class action-pursuing his individual claim and appealing
after final judgment is entered. If the class plaintiff is unsuccessful on his
individual claim, this method of securing review does not present a
problem; the plaintiff will most likely appeal the judgment and the class
certification ruling. Of course, in the meantime the parties and the trial
court will have wasted a substantial amount of time, effort, and money.
On the other hand, the possibility of review is diminished
considerably if the individual plaintiff succeeds on the merits. It is highly
uncertain what will happen if the appellate court reverses the class
certification decision after a plaintiff has prevailed on the merits. Quite
possibly the plaintiff will lose the benefit of his judgment,
[fjor .. . the appellate court . . .may conclude at the same time that it
would be improper merely to order that notice pursuant to rule [sic] 23(c)(2)
be sent to the members of the class without a new trial, since such disposition
of the appeal would permit members of the class to make their decisions
whether to join in the action at a time when they already know its outcome-a
form of "one-way" intervention that the 1966 amendments were designed to
prevent . . .or . . . that such a disposition would be unfair to the
defendant since it would result in a judgment against him significantly larger
in amount than the liability against which he litigated his defense at the
trial.2
12
There is a good chance, therefore, that the named plaintiff will choose not
to seek review of the certification order, especially if he has an
economically significant claim and originally brought the class action only
to defray the cost of litigation. The class members would consequently be
left without a "champion.,
213
It is also likely that the members of an uncertified class would not be
able to rely on the judgment for its preclusive effect. Ordinarily a final
211. Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 444, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977).
212. Note, supra note 12, at 1294. See also Note, supra note 11, at 574-76.
213. Note, supra note 12.
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judgment serves to prevent relitigation of the issues decided in the action in
which it was entered. It is possible, however, that a court might refuse to
give a judgment in favor of the named plaintiff binding effect in later
actions by the "class" members. There are several reasons for this. First,
the necessity of deciding who is and who is not a member of the class would
present grave practical difficulties. Identifying the class members is
frequently the most difficult aspect of class litigation, and the possibility of
repeating this process in ten thousand individual actions, if there were ten
thousand members in a potential class, might lead a court toward other
alternatives.
Second, the 1966 amendments to federal Rule 23 were intended to put
an end to "one-way intervention" in class actions.1 4 Prior to the
amendments, a class litigant in a "spurious" class action was bound by an
adverse judgment on the merits only if he chose to join in the action. 215 A
few courts permitted class members to join after a decision on the merits,
thereby leaving open the possibility that an individual could take
advantage of a favorable judgment without being bound by one against
him.216 This practice has much the same effect as the offensive use of
collateral estoppel by an absent class member under the present Rule 23. It
is therefore unlikely, in light of the policy behind the 1966 amendments,
that a class member could rely on the named plaintiff's action as a binding
determination of the issues.
Last, the courts have been cautious in applying collateral estoppel in
this area, as illustrated by the treatment that has been afforded "test cases."
On various occasions the parties to a class action have advocated litigation
of a test case by the named plaintiff and the defendant as an alternative to
the normal Rule 23 procedure.2 7 The theory behind this proposal is that
collateral estoppel would bind the defendant in the event of ajudgment for
the plaintiff, while the defendant would have the advantage of stare decisis
if the judgement were in his favor.218 Clearly, this procedure places the
defendant in a less favorable position than if the action were to proceed
under Rule 23, but such is the nature of collateral estoppel. Moreover,
214. The Advisory Committee's report noted:
Hitherto, in a few actions conducted as "spurious" class actions and thus nominally
designed to extend only to parties and others intervening before the determination of liability,
courts have held or intimated that class members might be permitted to intervene after a
decision on the merits favorable to their interests, in order to secure the benefits of the
decision for themselves, although they would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable
decision . . . . Under proposed subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded; the
action will have been early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the formercase
the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class, as above stated.
Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966)
(emphasis in original).
215. See id. at 105. A spurious class was the equivalent ofa class certified under subsection (b3)
of the present Rule.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 758-62 (4th Cir. 1974).
218. Id. at 759.
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advocates of the "test case" pointed out that the resulting savings in time
and expense, particularly the elimination of notice costs, more than
compensated for this shortcoming.1 9
The Fourth Circuit considered the use of test cases in Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp.220 In a very persuasive opinion the court noted that past
Supreme Court decisions had left open the possible application of
collateral estoppel,22t and that the public at large did not derive any
substantial benefit from class actions that would favor their use over the
alternative procedure.222 The court was nonetheless reluctant to endorse a
broad application of collateral estoppel, holding that a test case could be
used only if the defendant agreed to be bound by the result- and then only
if a normal Rule 23 proceeding would create an extraordinary hardship.
In light of this lukewarm reception, it is doubtful if the test case or
collateral estoppel presents much of an alternative.224 A class member
could, of course, still intervene for the purpose of appealing the
certification order after entry of final judgment in the named plaintiff's
action.225 Without the benefit of collateral estoppel, however, an
individual would really be doing little more than commencing a new
action. Moreover, this method of review assumes that there will be a class
member who is willing to intervene.
It is clear, therefore, that Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner leave no
effective means of securing the review of a district court's class certification
denial. As a result, many small claims-claims that do not warrant the
expense of individual litigation-will never be adjudicated.
Some would say that these claims should not be litigated. In the
succinct, if somewhat abrupt, words of the Third Circuit in Hackett v.
General Host Corp.:
226
If in some cases . . . the individual claim often will be so small that neither
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 759 (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. Foundation, 402 U.S, 313 (1971)),
222. Id. at 762.
223. Id.
224. The impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S.
Ct. 645 (1979), on class actions is an open question. In Parklane the Court removed the long-standing
bar on the use ofcollateral estoppel by plaintiffs who are neither parties noi in privity with a party to the
earlier judgment that is to be given preclusive effect. Clearly this holding could have a bearing in cases
like Katz, especially since the plaintiffs in Parklane were suing on behalf of a class. Id. at 648. On the
other hand, Parklane did little more than legitimate a position that the lower federal courts had taken
all along; see, e.g., Poster Exchange, Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Rachall v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904
(1971); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev.. E.D.Wash. 1962), aJ'dsub
norn. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). It is
doubtful that the courts will look upon collateral estoppel or the test case doctrine any more favorably
today than they did when Katz was decided. A continued adherence to Katz is particularly likely
because Parklane gives the lower courts broad discretionary power to determine when collateral
estoppel should be applied. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
225. See United Air Lines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
226. 455 F.2d at 626.
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private nor public lawyers think it should be litigated, then that decision of
the legal marketplace may be the best reflection of a public consciousness that
the time of the lawyers and of the court should best be spent elsewhere.
But contrast the position taken by Judge Robinson of the District of
Columbia Circuit:
It is hardly necessary in this age to argue the worth of the class action in
our ever-expanding system of jurisprudence. Over the years it has promoted
the convenience of courts and parties infinitely, reduced the expense of
lawsuits incalculably, and . . . contributed immeasurably to efficient
judicial administration. It has, too, made its mark on the development of the
law. The reports are dotted with landmark cases which without benefit of
representative litigation would never have seen the light of day.
Even more profoundly, the class action has provided access to the
judicial process for those who need it most. It has been the refuge of the poor,
the hope of the downtrodden, and the salvation of the many whom oursocial
institutions all too frequently victimize, unwittingly or otherwise. Truly it is
said that "[t]he class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant
has against those who command the status quo."
In sum, as two leading authorities have aptly observed, "[ilt now is
apparent that the increasing complexity and urbanization of modem
American society has tremendously magnified the importance of the class
action as a procedural device for resolving disputes affecting numerous
people." And since class litigation could be chilled by nonappealability of
denials of certifications save in narrowly limited circumstances, it is highly
important to ascertain whether [those orders should be nonappealable]. "22
CONCLUSION
Any assessment of Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner must ultimately
turn on the analyst's perception of the role of the Americanjudicial system
and, in particular, of class actions. As this writer has indicated, Coopers &
Lybrand and Gardner effectively denied small litigants the opportunity to
vindicate their rights. If one is willing to accept the result, the Supreme
Court arguably decided both cases correctly. On the other hand, those who
are offended by the thought that an individual may have a cause of action
but no remedy will find the decisions hard to justify.
Searching inquiry has produced no consensus concerning the social
and legal value of class actions. In particular, no one has satisfactorily
resolved the question whether denial of class certification should be
immediately appealable. One could scarcely expect that the Court would
have provided the solution in Coopers & Lybrand and Gardner. It is
nevertheless unfortunate that the Supreme Court, when squarely
presented with a problem of this importance, refused to acknowledge that
there even was an issue.
Michael K. Ording
227. Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363,371 (D.C.Cir.) (Robinson, J., dissenting), cert. denied.
423 U.S. 828 (1975).
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